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Abstract
A collision attack on NaSHA-512 was proposed by L. Ji et al. The
claimed complexity of the attack is 2192. The proposed attack is re-
alized by using a suitable differential pattern. In this note we show
that the correct result that can be inferred from their differential pat-
tern is in fact a conditional one. It can be stated correctly as fol-
lows: A collision attack on NaSHA-512 of complexity k = 1, 2, . . . , 2320
can be performed with an unknown probability of success pk, where
0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p2320 ≤ 1. Consequently, the attack proposed by L. Ji
et al. can be considered only as a direction how a possible collision
attack on NaSHA-512 could be realized. The birthday attack remains
the best possible attack on NaSHA-512.
1 Introduction
Recently, a collision attack on NaSHA-512 hash function was proposed by
L. Ji, X. Liangyu and G. Xu [1]. NaSHA(m,k,r) is a new family of hash
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functions [2] proposed for SHA-3, and the attack is on its 512-bit hash
version. The attackers claim that their attack is of complexity 2192, but
they do not give a profound analysis of their estimation. Here we show that
if a collision attack on NaSHA-512 of complexity 2192 can be performed,
then a system E of three quasigroup equations with five unknowns will have
a solution. There are no theoretical results for solvability of quasigroup
equations, so no one can check if that system E of quasigroup equations has
a solution, especially having in mind that the quasigroups are of order 264.
On the other side, in the set of quasigroups of order 4, we have examples of
systems of equations of kind similar as E with empty set of solutions, that
can be effectively checked. Hence, the attack proposed in [1] can be taken
only as conditional one.
In order to make this note readable, we use the same notation, as well
as the citations, from [1]. So, we recommend to the reader to follow both
[1] and this note.
2 Short description of NaSHA-(512,2,6)
We give a short description of NaSHA-(512,2,6) at first.
Let denote the 1024-bit initial chaining value of NaSHA-(512,2,6) by
H = H1||H2|| . . . ||H16 and let denote a 1024-bit message block by M =
M1||M2|| . . . ||M16, where Hi and Mi are 64-bits words. Then, the state of
the compression function is defined to be the 2048-bit word
S =M1||H1||M2||H2|| . . . ||M16||H16,
represented as 32 64-bit words S = S1||S2|| . . . ||S32. Then NaSHA transform
the word S into the word S′ =MT (LinTr32512(S)), where LinTr512 andMT
are defined as
LinTr512(S1||S2|| . . . ||S31||S32) = (S7 ⊕ S15 ⊕ S25 ⊕ S32)||S1||S2|| . . . ||S31,
MT = ρ(RAl1) ◦ Al2 .
The definition of ρ(RAl1) is irrelevant for the attack, and the transformation
Al2 is defined iteratively by
Al2(x1, . . . , x32) = (z1, . . . , z32)⇔ zj =
{
(l2 + x1) ∗ x1, j = 1
(zj−1 + xj) ∗ xj , 2 ≤ j ≤ 32
(1)
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Here, l2 is a constant, ⊕ denotes the bitwise xoring, + denotes the addition
modulo 264 and ∗ denotes a quasigroup operation defined by an extended
Feistel network FA,B,C as x ∗ y = FA,B,C(x ⊕ y) ⊕ y. If there is another
message block for processing, every second 64-bit word from S′ goes as
chaining value in the next iteration. If the processed block is the last one,
every forth 64-bit word from S′ goes as hash result.
The extended Feistel network FA,B,C is a permutation of the set {0, 1}64
and is defined in NASHA by
FA,B,C(L||R) = (R⊕A)||(L⊕B ⊕ fa1,b1,c1,a2,b2,c2,a3,b3,c3,α,β,γ(R⊕ C))
where a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2, a3, b3, c3 are 8-bit words, α, β, γ are 16-bit words,
A,B,C are 32-bit words, L,R are 32-bit variables and f is a suitably defined
function. So, the quasigroup operation ∗ in NaSHA used in transformation
Al2 depends on 15 parameters a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2, a3, b3, c3, α, β, γ, A,B,C.
These parameters and the constant l2 are different in every iteration of the
compression function and depend on the processed message block. They are
obtained from the equalities:
l2 = S3 + S4,
a1||b1||c1||a2||b2||c2||a3||b3 = S5 + S6, c3 = a1,
α||β||γ||α2 = S7 + S8,
A||B = S11 + S12, C||A2 = S13 + S14,
the values α2 and A2 are irrelevant for the attack.
3 Setting the attack parameters
The attack is based on a differential pattern obtained by using the differ-
ence 0x00000000FFFFFFFF, where 0 = 0000, F = 1111. Several very clever
observations are obtained.
1) Let x be any 64-bit word. Denote by (x)i the i-th bit of x and
construct a new 64-bit word a by (a)64...33 = ¬(x)64...33, (a)32 = 1 and
(a)31...1 = 0. Note thata a = a(x) is a function of x. Define a difference
∆x = 0x00000000FFFFFFFF. Then for the word x′ = x ⊕∆x the following
equality is true:
(a+ x) ∗ x = (a+ x′) ∗ x′,
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where ⊕ denotes the 64-bit XOR, + denotes the addition modulo 264 and
∗ denotes the quasigroup operation defined by an extended Feistel network
FA,B,C . Here A, B, C are parameters that are computed from the input
message and the chaining values.
2) If the parameters a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2, a3, b3, c3, α, β, γ are known, i.e.,
the function f is defined, then the parameters A, B, C can be chosen such
that the following equalities hold true:
(a+ x) ∗ x = a = (a+ x′) ∗ x′.
3) The initial chaining value of NaSHA is H = H1||H2|| . . . ||H16 and let
take an input messageM =M1||M2|| . . . ||M16, where Hi andMi are 64-bits
words. Only the wordsMi can be chosen in a suitable way a collision attack
to be realized. The idea of the attack is to find two different 1024-bits input
messages M and M ′ such that
Al2(LinTr32512(M1||H1||M2||H2|| . . . ||M16||H16)) =
= Al′2(LinTr32512((M ′1||H1||M ′2||H2|| . . . ||M ′16||H16)).
The values of l2 and l′2 are defined after LinTr32512 is applied.
4) Let denote
LinTr32512(M1||H1||M2||H2|| . . . ||M16||H16) = S1||S2|| . . . ||S32,
LinTr32512(M
′
1||H1||M ′2||H2|| . . . ||M ′16||H16) = S′1||S′2|| . . . ||S′32.
Then, M (as well as M ′) can be recovered from S1||S2|| . . . ||S32 by using
LinTr−1512. Recall that now in NaSHA l2 and l
′
2 are defined by l2 = S3 +
S4, l
′
2 = S
′
3 + S
′
4.
4 Collision attacks on NaSHA
5) Take an arbitrary 64-bits word x and the differential
∆x = 0x00000000FFFFFFFF.
Note that x can be chosen at 264 manners.
6) Suppose that the input messages M and M ′ satisfy the conditions
M1 = M ′1,M2 = M ′2,M3 = M ′3 ⊕ ∆x,M4 = M ′4,M5 = M ′5 ⊕ ∆x,M6 =
M ′6⊕∆x,M7 =M ′7⊕∆x,M8 =M ′8,M9 =M ′9⊕∆x,M10 =M ′10⊕∆x,M11 =
M ′11 ⊕ ∆x,M12 = M ′12,M13 = M ′13,M14 = M ′14,M15 = M ′15 ⊕ ∆x,M16 =
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M ′16 ⊕∆x. Then we have that S9 = S′9 ⊕∆x, S10 = S′10 ⊕∆x, S17 = S′17 ⊕
∆x, S18 = S′18⊕∆x, S19 = S′19⊕∆x, S20 = S′20⊕∆x, S21 = S′21⊕∆x, S29 =
S′29 ⊕∆x, S31 = S′31 ⊕∆x.
7) Now choose the values for the words Si and S′i in a suitable manner.
By using LinTr−1512 corresponding messages M and M
′ will be obtained.
7.1) Take S9 = x′ = x ⊕ ∆x, S10 = S17 = S18 = S19 = S20 = S21 =
S29 = S30 = S31 = x and S′9 = x, S′10 = S′17 = S′18 = S′19 = S′20 = S′21 =
S′29 = S′31 = x′ = x⊕∆x.
7.2) Take S5 = S′5 = y5, S6 = S′6 = y6, S7 = S′7 = y7, S8 = S′8 =
y8, S11 = S′11 = y11, S14 = S′14 = y14, where yi are unknown (free) words.
7.3) By using the equality (1) of [1], the words S1, S2, S3, S4, S12, S13, S15,
S16, S22, S23, S24, S25, S26, S27, S28, S32 can be expressed by the initial chain-
ing valueH, the word x and the unknown words y5, y6, y7, y8, y11, y14. Hence,
they are functions of x, y5, y6, y7, y8, y11, y14.
7.4) The parameters a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2, a3, b3, c3, α, β, γ, A,B,C and the
constants l2, l′2 now can be expressed as functions of x, y5, y6, y7, y8, y11, y14
as well:
l2 = l′2 = S3(x, y5, y6, y7, y8, y11, y14) + S4(x, y5, y6, y7, y8, y11, y14),
a1||b1||c1||a2||b2||c2||a3||b3 = y5 + y6,
α||β||γ||α2 = y7 + y8,
A||B = y11 + S12(x, y7, y8),
C||A2 = S13(x, y6) + y14.
7.5) The parameters A,B,C of FA,B,C have to be determined in such a
way the equality (a + x) ∗ x = a to be satisfied. For that aim at first fixed
values to y5, y6, y7, y8 have to be given, and after that the values for y11 and
y14 can be computed. Note that now S11 = y11 and S14 = y14 are functions
of x, y5, y6, y7, y8.
8) Note that after the values of y5, y6, y7 and y8 are chosen, all the words
Si and S′i are determined. We have to check if the equalities
Al2(S1||S2|| . . . ||S32) = Al′2(S′1||S′2|| . . . ||S′32) = z1||z2|| . . . ||z32
hold for some zi.
The differential pattern of the attack is defined in such a way that
z8||z9||z10 = a||a||a,
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z16|| . . . ||z21 = a||a||a||a||a||a,
z28|| . . . ||z31 = a||a||a||a.
Then only the values of z1, . . . , z7, z11, . . . , z15, z22, . . . , z27 and z32 have
to be found.
8.1) We can compute z1 = (l2 + S1) ∗ S1, z2 = (z1 + S2) ∗ S2, z3 =
(z2 + S3) ∗ S3, . . . , z7 = (z6 + S7) ∗ S7. Note that z1, . . . , z7 are functions of
x, y5, y6, y7, y8.
Now, the equality z8 = a, i.e., (z7+S8) ∗S8 = a, has to be satisfied,
in order the transformations Al2 and Al′2 to be fulfilled.
8.2) If z8 = a holds true, we can compute z11 = (a + S11) ∗ S11, z12 =
(z11+S12)∗S12, . . . , z15 = (z14+S15)∗S15. Note that z11, . . . , z15 are functions
of x, y5, y6, y7, y8.
Now, the equality z16 = a, i.e., (z15 + S16) ∗ S16 = a, has to be
satisfied, in order the transformations Al2 and Al′2 to be fulfilled.
8.3) If z8 = a and z16 = a hold true, we can compute z22 = (a + S22) ∗
S22, z23 = (z22+S232)∗S23, . . . , z27 = (z26+S27)∗S27. Note that z22, . . . , z27
are functions of x, y5, y6, y7, y8.
Now, the equality z28 = a, i.e., (z27 + S28) ∗ S28 = a, has to be
satisfied, in order the transformations Al2 and Al′2 to be fulfilled.
8.4) If z8 = a, z16 = a and z28 = a hold true, we can compute z32 =
(a+ S32) ∗ S32.
5 Solvability of quasigroup equations
In order the above attack to be successful, for some values of the variables
x, y5, y6, y7, y8 the following equalities have to be satisfied: z8 = a, z16 = a
and z28 = a. Then we have that the next proposition is true:
Proposition 1 If there is a collision on NaSHA-512 obtained by the attack
as explained in 1) – 8), then the system E of three quasigroup equations with
fife variables
(z7(x, y5, y6, y7, y8) + S8(x, y5, y6, y7, y8)) ∗ S8(x, y5, y6, y7, y8) = a(x)
(z15(x, y5, y6, y7, y8) + S16(x, y5, y6, y7, y8)) ∗ S16(x, y5, y6, y7, y8) = a(x)
(z27(x, y5, y6, y7, y8) + S28(x, y5, y6, y7, y8)) ∗ S28(x, y5, y6, y7, y8) = a(x)
has a solution, where zi are obtained iteratively as in 8).
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There are not known any results for solving systems of quasigroup equa-
tions, except checking all possible solutions. So, for the system E we have to
make 2320 checks to find a solution, if any. Of course, it can not be realized,
at least with today computing power. Next we give two examples of systems
of quasigroup equations in the set of quasigroups of order 4 that have empty
set of solutions.
Example 1 The system of two quasigroup equations with 3 unknowns
x, y, a:
((1 + x+ y) ∗ (1 + y) + 2 + x+ y) ∗ y = a,
((3 + x+ y) ∗ y + x+ y) ∗ (x+ y + 1) = a
has no solution in the quasigroup
∗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 2 1 3
1 3 0 2 1
2 1 3 0 2
3 2 1 3 0
Example 2 The system of three quasigroup equations with 5 unknowns
x, y, z, u, a:
r(x, y, z, u) :=
{
{[(1+ x+ y+ z) ∗ (2+ x+ z+ u) + 3+ x+ u] ∗ (1+ y) +
2 + z + u} ∗ (1 + z)
}
∗ u = a,
s(x, y, z, u) :=
{
{[(3 + x + y) ∗ (z + u) + 1 + x + y + z] ∗ (x + z)+
1 + x+ z + u} ∗ (1 + x+ y) + 1 + x+ u
}
∗ (y + z) = a,
t(x, y, z, u) :=
{
{[(1 + y + u) ∗ (y + z) + z + u] ∗ (x+ z + u)+
2 + y + z} ∗ z + z + 1
}
∗ (3 + y + u) = a
has no solution in the quasigroup
∗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 3 2 1 0
2 2 3 0 1
3 1 0 3 2
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6 Conclusion
The attack given in [1] is a very sophisticated one and a lot of effort is given to
be realized. Nevertheless, it is not a valuable attack on NaSHA-512. We do
not know if the system of quasigroup equations E : z8 = a, z16 = a, z28 = a
with fife unknowns has a solution in a quasigroup of order 264. The attacker
are stating that there is a collision of NaSHA-512 of complexity 2192, but
one can state that there is a collision of complexity 264 as well. The proper
statement that can be inferred from the attack designed as in [1] is the
following: For each k = 1, 2, . . . , 2320 there is a collision attack on
NaSHA-512 of complexity k that can be realized with probability
pk. The Probabilities pk are not known and 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤
p2320 ≤ 1.
Still, the best attack on NaSHA-512 is the birthday attack.
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